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raising the alarm about others; activists can try to counter these tactics. As a general rule, it is better for 
campaigners to choose methods that highlight and accentuate double standards and make it more 
difficult for opponents to adopt the high ground. 
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Activists often encounter double standards: powerful groups make a huge 
outcry about a problem, meanwhile ignoring their own greater role in exactly 
the same problem. For example, governments with major nuclear arsenals 
raise the alarm about the possibility that others might acquire nuclear 
weapons. Powerful groups use a variety of tactics to reduce awareness and 
concern about their own actions while raising the alarm about others; 
activists can try to counter these tactics. As a general rule, it is better for 
campaigners to choose methods that highlight and accentuate double 
standards and make it more difficult for opponents to adopt the high ground. 
 
Introduction 
Many campaigners encounter a perplexing and frustrating phenomenon. Your 
opponents accuse you of doing something terrible — but actually your 
opponents do the same thing just as much or even a great deal more. For 
example, your opponents are engaged in massive censorship, but accuse you of 
censorship, or your opponents are engaged in serious terrorism but accuse you 
of being a terrorist. It seems like gross hypocrisy, yet it can be hard to address. 
A classic example involves nuclear weapons. Over the past two decades, the US 
government has raised the alarm that Iraq, and more recently Iran, might be 
obtaining nuclear weapons, with the danger presented as so acute that invasion 
is a potential remedy. During this whole time, the US government has been 
sitting on thousands of nuclear weapons, and it is just one of several nuclear-
armed states about which there is barely a peep of official concern. How can the 
US government get away with its indignation about alleged Iraqi and Iranian 
nuclear weapons when it is the world’s leading nuclear-armed state? And what 
can anti-nuclear campaigners do about it? 
On a smaller scale, in confrontations between protesters and police, there can 
be plenty of police violence and brutality, but somehow the media frame the 
story as a “violent protest” rather than “violent police.” It’s as if the actions of 
one side are invisible. 
These are examples of double standards in campaigning. A standard is applied 
to one side, for example concerning nuclear weapons or use of violence, but is 
not applied to the other side. One way this is done is by an implicit attribution of 
guilt or danger to one side and virtue to the other: their nuclear weapons are 
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processes operating in conjunction: reducing concern about what one side is 
doing while increasing it about the other side’s actions. 
To examine campaigning double standards, I first look at methods for 
determining whether a double standard is involved. Then I catalogue techniques 
used by the more powerful group to reduce awareness and concern about their 
own actions while stigmatising the opponent’s, using a series of examples to 
illustrate the techniques. Finally, I outline possible responses to these 
techniques. 
 
Is there a double standard? 
Just listening to claims and counter-claims, sometimes it can be difficult to 
decide who is right. Neither side may be giving a balanced perspective. 
Ultimately, there is no substitute for investigating claims and making an 
assessment. What should you look for? 
To begin, it might seem worth looking at the stated goals of each side. However, 
these might be hidden, misleading or self-serving. For example, if the Iranian 
government is developing nuclear weapons, it might not want to admit this. 
Most experts say the Israeli military has hundreds of nuclear weapons, but the 
Israeli government has never admitted having any. The US government says its 
weapons are for defence or deterrence. So, at least in the case of nuclear 
weapons, stated goals are not very revealing. 
More useful is looking at who has power, whether this is military power, 
economic power, support from established authorities or some other source of 
power. Compare, for example, al Qaeda with the US government. Al Qaeda has 
support from hundreds or thousands of fighters around the world and is able to 
participate in combat in some places (for example, Syria and Yemen) and 
initiate terrorist attacks, most famously 9/11. However, the US government has 
vastly more power, including to launch wars, assassinate opponents through 
drone attacks, fund massive surveillance operations, and imprison and 
interrogate its perceived enemies. So the US government has a much greater 
capacity to terrorise opponents, and wider populations, than al Qaeda. Indeed, 
the US government has the capacity to destroy much of the al Qaeda 
organisation, whereas al Qaeda has no prospect of overturning the US 
government. 
Another criterion for double standards is the consequences for each side of 
actions taken. If actions affect one side much more than the other without 
corresponding levels of concern, this is an indication of likely double standards. 
Consider, for example, Israeli government condemnation of the violence of 
Palestinian youths who threw stones during the first intifada, 1987–1993. 
Although a few Israeli soldiers were hurt, a much larger number of Palestinians 
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Some caution is needed in assessing impacts in cases where responsibility is 
unclear. In some struggles, members of one side will pretend to be on the 
opponent’s side and take actions that discredit it. Police sometimes disguise 
themselves as protesters, infiltrate protest groups and urge the use of violence, 
or even initiate it themselves. These agents provocateurs encourage protester 
violence so that police seem justified in using much greater violence. With such 
“black operations,” in which appearances are deceptive, the consequences of 
actions may be attributed to the wrong group (Lubbers 2012; Soley and Nichols 
1987). 
In summary, the key criterion for assessing double standards in campaigning 
struggles is differences in power. If one side has much more power than the 
other, yet complains vociferously about actions by the other side, it is wise to be 
sceptical. However, power alone does not prove double standards, because 
sometimes power is not exercised or is used with restraint. So it is necessary to 
assess the consequences of actions by each side. If the side with much more 
power is also causing much more harm, then this side’s complaints about being 
a victim may reflect a double standard.  
My friend Jørgen Johansen often uses five criteria to compare words and 
actions. As applied to the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, he provides this 
assessment of NATO governments’ rhetoric and actions. 
• What did they say? British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President Bill 
Clinton said the bombing was to prevent ethnic cleansing and to promote 
democracy and human rights. 
• What were they doing? Massive bombing from high altitudes. 
• What were the immediate results? Massive violations of human rights, 
without increased democracy. 
• What were the long-term results? Ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosova. 
• Who benefited in the long run? The US military built its largest foreign 
military base since the Vietnam war on occupied Serbian territory.  
Jørgen’s conclusion: there is no correlation between words and deeds. 
For any issue, there is no substitute for a careful analysis, looking at evidence 
and arguments. Special care is needed when there is the possibility of black 
operations in which actions may be attributed to the wrong side. 
 
Examples 
Here are a few cases of conflicts in which each side potentially could accuse the 
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Violence in the first intifada 
In the first Palestinian intifada (1987–1993), most of the resistance methods 
used by Palestinians were nonviolent, for example rallies, boycotts and setting 
up systems of home-based schooling (Dajani 1994; Kaufman-Lacusta 2010; 
King 2007; Rigby 2015). Many Israelis declaimed against Palestinian violence, 
in particular youths throwing stones against Israeli troops. 
Analysis The Israeli military had vastly more weaponry and capacity for 
violence than the Palestinians. Few if any Israeli troops were killed by stone-
throwing, whereas thousands of Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops during 
the first intifada. 
 
Terrorism 
Terrorist attacks kill civilians and are widely condemned by governments and 
citizens. The 9/11 attacks are the most prominent example, but there have been 
thousands of other attacks. However, it is also possible to talk about “state 
terrorism,” in which governments terrorise citizens, including through mass 
killing (Chomsky and Herman 1979; Herman 1982; Stohl and Lopez 1984). Two 
prominent examples are genocide in Indonesia 1965–1966 (500,000 or more 
killed) and in Guatemala in the 1980s (200,000 killed), in each case with little 
or no apparent concern expressed by the US or most other western 
governments. 
Analysis States have vastly more power than non-state groups; state terrorism 
has killed far more civilians than non-state terrorism. 
  
Leaking  
When low-level government employees leak documents to journalists or others, 
politicians make a great play about how terrible this is, often carrying out witch-
hunts for leakers. The leakers Chelsea Manning  and Edward Snowden have 
been denounced as traitors (Greenwald 2014; Gurnow 2014; Harding 2014; 
Madar 2012). Meanwhile, politicians and high-level officials routinely leak 
confidential information — including classified information — to journalists, 
often for personal or political advantage. However, this seldom receives any 
comment, much less criticism (Horton 2015, pp. 129–151; Pozen 2012). 
Analysis Politicians who leak have far more power than the low-level employees 
they castigate for leaking. 
 
Nuclear weapons 
Countries with substantial nuclear arsenals include the US, Russia, China, 
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countries spend much effort raising the alarm about the possibility of nuclear 
weapons being acquired by other governments, such as Iraq and Iran. 
Analysis The long-standing nuclear weapons states have far more power than 
other states that are alleged to be seeking nuclear weapons. 
 
These are just some of the many instances of double standards found in a range 
of issues. The typical configuration is that there is a powerful group doing 
something that some might see as wrong, such as censorship, violence or 
nuclear threats. However, the powerful group accuses others of exactly the same 
action and loudly condemns it. Sometimes the powerful group is so successful at 
shaping perceptions that few even realise a double standard is involved. For 
example, few people think of major governments as terrorists.  
 
Selling a double standard 
To get away with double standards, the more powerful group usually relies on 
two sets of processes: one is to reduce awareness and concern about its own 
actions; the other is to raise the alarm about the opponent’s actions.  
Powerful perpetrators commonly use five types of methods to reduce public 
outrage over actions potentially seen as unjust (Martin 2007, 2012):  
 
• covering up the action;  
• devaluing the target;  
• reinterpreting the events by lying, minimising consequences, blaming others, 
and favourable framing;  
• using official channels to give an appearance of justice;  
• intimidating and rewarding people involved.  
 
Raising the alarm about someone’s actions involves a parallel set of methods: 
 
• exposing the action 
• validating the target 
• interpreting the events as an injustice 
• avoiding or discrediting official channels; instead, mobilising support 





Interface: a journal for and about social movements Action note 




Powerful perpetrators may use both sets of methods selectively, reducing 
outrage about their own actions while drumming up concern about their 
opponents’ actions. 
 
Cover-up and exposure 
The powerful group typically does everything possible to draw people’s attention 
to the allegedly terrible actions of its opponent. These terrible actions, by 
repeatedly being brought to awareness, become all-consuming, and alternative 
concerns become afterthoughts. 
Meanwhile, the powerful group, if possible, hides its own activities. This is 
possible in some cases. Torture, for example, is almost always carried out in 
secrecy. However, in many cases, the actions of the powerful group are almost 
impossible to hide, for example the possession of nuclear weapons arsenals. In 
these cases, there are two main options. One is to say nothing about it, so people 
don’t pay attention to it, even though the evidence is overwhelming. The other 
option is to reinterpret the actions, as discussed below. 
 
Devaluation and validation 
The powerful group nearly always tries to discredit and defame its opponent. If 
the opponent is devalued, then what is done to it does not seem so bad. Leaks by 
low-level employees are painted as security threats and the leakers castigated as 
traitors, malcontents, or even terrorists. 
At the same time, the powerful group paints itself as virtuous, with the 
implication that its actions are praiseworthy. Nuclear weapons states portray 
themselves as responsible members of the international community, defending 
freedom and preserving the peace. They present themselves as qualitatively 
different from “rogue states” that are alleged to be a serious danger to 
international security. 
When one group can portray itself as good in a struggle against evil, this allows 
double standards to persist without critical examination. When terrorists are 
seen as evil and those who oppose them are thought of as the “good guys,” the 




The powerful group can use various techniques to convince people that its 
opponents are in the wrong while it is in the right. One technique is lying. For 
example, while governments decry torture elsewhere, they deny doing it 
themselves. A second technique is minimising consequences. When justifying 
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was not so great. A third technique is to blame others. At Abu Ghraib prison, 
torture was blamed on prison guards, with higher-level officials exempted from 
responsibility. A fourth technique, often the most powerful one, is framing. 
What opponents do is said to be torture, but the US government labelled actions 
at Abu Ghraib as “abuse,” never using the word torture, and US media went 
along with this framing.  
Similarly, the term “leaking” is applied to anonymous disclosures by low-level 
employees, whereas when politicians and top officials leak information, it is 
framed by the media in different ways, for example “a source revealed” or 
“according to a knowledgeable official.” For leaks by low-level workers, the 
language used focuses attention on the leaker, whereas for high-level leakers, 
the language focuses attention on the information leaked, without invoking the 
concept of leaking. 
 
Official channels versus mobilisation 
Official channels include regulatory agencies, courts, treaties and a host of other 
processes and agencies that are supposed to resolve problems and provide 
justice. Powerful groups, rather than allowing official channels to operate 
independently and fairly, often use them to defend themselves and to attack 
opponents. 
As a response to public concerns about nuclear weapons, governments 
negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to the treaty, non-
weapons states are supposed to avoid moves towards nuclear weapons; in 
return, weapons states are supposed to eliminate their arsenals. In practice, the 
treaty has been used against potential newcomers to the nuclear club, with the 
nuclear disarmament aspect of the treaty largely ignored. 
In the conflict between Israel and Palestine, there have been numerous formal 
processes invoked, for example the 1993 Oslo accords and various “peace 
processes.” These have given the appearance of moving towards a resolution of 
grievances. However, the Israeli government has not changed its actions on the 
ground in relation to several vital matters, for example the return of 
Palestinians expelled decades earlier. Meanwhile, attention to the various 
supposed peace processes soothes audiences expecting something to be done. 
 
Intimidation and resistance 
Powerful groups commonly attempt to intimidate opponents and anyone who 
might help them, for example journalists. Meanwhile, these same powerful 
groups make a great issue of alleged threats from their opponents.  
The US government maintains troops in over a hundred other countries, has 
invaded various countries, uses drone attacks for extra-judicial assassinations 
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intimidate opponents. At the same time, it devotes enormous resources to 
resisting intimidation by non-state terrorists, al Qaeda in particular, and 
attempts to mobilise public concern about threats from terrorists. 
When workers speak out about corruption or abuses, their employers often label 
them as snitches or troublemakers, and subject them to harassment, ostracism, 
reprimands or dismissal. These are methods of intimidation that serve to deter 
others from becoming whistleblowers. The US government treated Chelsea 
Manning, who leaked war logs and diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks, savagely, 
with months of solitary confinement. Meanwhile, employers make a great play 
about the damage caused by whistleblowers, presenting themselves as the 
victims of a sort of attack. 
In summary, powerful groups use five sets of processes to reduce concern about 
their own actions while drumming up concern about less significant actions by 
their challengers. What can activists do to counter these double standards? 
The immediately obvious response is to raise the alarm about abuses and to put 
their own actions into perspective. The tables give examples for the cases of 
terrorism and leaking. 
 
Table 1. Challenging government alarm about terrorism 
 




Cover-up and exposure Hide complicity in state 
terrorism; publicise 
evidence of non-state 
terrorism 
Collect information 
about state terrorism 




terrorists; praise own 
troops 
Use the label “state 
terrorism” 
Interpretation Explain the need for 
security measures and 
foreign interventions; lie 




Expose justifications for 
state terrorism; propose 
alternative ways of 
responding to non-state 
terrorism 
Official channels versus 
mobilisation 
Refer critics to courts 
and appeal processes  
Mobilise support to 
challenge state terrorism 
Intimidation and 
resistance 
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Table 2. Challenging official alarm about leaking 
 




Cover-up and exposure Do not discuss leaking by 
high-level figures; 







Call low-level leakers 
traitors, snitches or 
malcontents; call high-
level leakers “sources” or 
“officials” 
Call low-level leakers 
“whistleblowers” or 
“public interest leakers” 
Interpretation Explain the need for 
official secrecy; lie about 
the damage caused by 
low-level leaks 
Explain the damage 
caused by excessive 
official secrecy and the 
benefits of access to 
information 
Official channels versus 
mobilisation 
Claim that whistleblower 
laws protect those who 
speak out  
Encourage 
whistleblowers to work 
with journalists and 
action groups rather 
than trusting in 
whistleblower protection  
Intimidation and 
resistance 
Search for low-level 
leakers and subject them 
to reprisals 
Help employees develop 
skills in leaking 
anonymously 
 
Accentuating the double standard 
Double standards can be challenged in several ways. As illustrated in the tables, 
there are various tactics to reduce concern about minor matters and increase 
concern about the behaviour of more serious offenders. There is also another 
step that can be highly effective: reduce or eliminate the pretext for criticism. 
In a rally, protesters might do some things like pushing police or yelling abuse 
that are minor in comparison to police brutality against them. Yet the 
government, police and media may make a great play about protester violence 
while drawing attention away from police violence. In this context, one reaction 
is for protesters to say, “we were justified in what we did.” That may be true, but 
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used against protesters. A different strategy is to undermine suggestions of 
protester aggression, for example by using humour, formal dress, silence or 
other techniques to establish an image of non-aggressiveness. In this context, 
police violence will seem much greater, and is more likely to backfire on the 
police (Martin 2007, pp. 43–64).  
In the first intifada, the Palestinians primarily used methods of resistance 
causing no physical harm to Israelis, such as boycotts, strikes and setting up 
their own education systems. Israeli troops used far more violence, but the 
limited Palestinian violence was enough for many Israelis to see the intifada as a 
violent uprising, thereby forming the wrong impression of Palestinian goals 
(Abrahms 2006). Some commentators therefore have recommended that it 
would be more effective for the Palestinian resistance to avoid stone-throwing 
(Dajani 1994). This would accentuate the double standard. 
This same consideration applies to many other situations involving double 
standards. The weaker side may be justified in its actions, because the other side 
is doing terrible things, but be more effective by avoiding any behaviour that 
can be negatively portrayed. 
Terrorism is another example. Many of those labelled “terrorists” are, in the 
eyes of others, freedom fighters. They feel justified in striking back against 
vicious repression or overwhelming oppression. Yet in doing so, the double 
standard is eroded. 
It is useful to remember that many challengers to repressive systems have been 
called terrorists. For example, the US government in the 1950s and 1960s 
referred to the National Liberation Front (or “Vietcong”) in Vietnam as 
terrorists, while its own military operations led to millions of casualties. In 
South Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s, the South African government called 
the African National Congress terrorists. In the Philippines, there has been a 
long-running armed insurgency, and the government calls the insurgents 
terrorists. However, the Philippines military has been involved in numerous 
human rights abuses that might better warrant the label “terrorism.” Today, in 
the US, environmental activists are sometimes called “eco-terrorists” even when 
their actions cause no loss of life. What is striking in these and other examples is 
that the label “terrorist” is applied only to challengers to dominant groups, 
whose own actions might better warrant the label. 
One option is to avoid any actions that can easily be labelled “terrorism.” 
Hijackings, bombings and suicide attacks, however justified, can readily be 
stigmatised. Even seemingly minor actions like throwing bricks through shop 
windows can be counterproductive via selective labelling. Choosing methods 
that are less easily stigmatised can be more effective. 
In Serbia, during the resistance to ruler Slobodan Milošević, members of the 
group Otpor made fun of the regime’s attempts to label activists as terrorists, by 
presenting to a crowd a mild-mannered student activist and doing a parody of 
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When to ignore double standards 
In some cases, it may be better for activists to ignore double standards. When 
the US government acts against nuclear weapons development in India, that 
may be a good thing, even if there are thousands of US nuclear weapons. When 
the Australian government signed the Kyoto climate change protocol, this sent a 
valuable signal, even though Australian greenhouse gas emissions per capita 
were among the highest in the world. 
Activists themselves are often accused of double standards, and sometimes are 
guilty. For example, a climate activist might fly to numerous international 
conferences or a public transport activist might sometimes drive a car. Very few 
individuals are able to live a blemish-free life. It is worth avoiding clashes 
between principles and practice when possible, but unrealistic expectations and 
rigid requirements should be questioned.  
 
Implications 
Activists need to be alert to the possibility of double standards and how to 
expose and challenge them. The first step is to be sceptical whenever a powerful 
group raises the alarm about someone or something else. The claims might be 
correct, and something unsavoury might be going on, but it is important to ask 
whether something more important is happening elsewhere but not receiving 
sufficient attention. For example, when a government raises the alarm about 
terrorism, it is worth examining the government’s own role in terrorising 
populations. 
The next step is to look at the methods used by the powerful group to increase 
concern about the problem. These include publicity, stigmatising others as 
dangerous or evil and using experts and formal investigations to give credibility 
to claims. In the case of nuclear weapons, there is much attention to 
governments of North Korea, Iraq and Iran that are assumed to be dangerous 
(“mad mullahs”; “axis of evil”), with international relations experts quoted in 
support. 
While concern is ramped up about dangers from the “other,” powerful groups 
seek to reduce outrage about their own actions. Standard methods are covering 
up their actions, labelling them as good, giving reasonable-sounding 
explanations and rewarding those who assist in this process. 
Seeing through double standards, and recognising the methods used to 
maintain them, is hard enough. Even more difficult is trying to expose them, as 
a means of opposing abuses of power. Five sorts of methods are useful: exposing 
the actions; blaming those responsible; explaining why actions are wrong; 
mobilising support and not relying on official channels for support; and 
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Finally, there is an important step: behaving in ways that accentuate double 
standards. If governments make accusations of terrorism, for example, then 
avoiding actions that can be labelled as dangerous can strengthen the 
movement. This often means using low-risk actions, such as boycotts and 
symbolic protests, that allow wide participation. The more people who join, 
especially when a cross section of the population participates, the harder it is to 
discredit them as terrorists. 
Many people believe in fairness as a fundamental value (Haidt 2012; Moore 
1978). Double standards represent a violation of the principle of fairness and 
therefore are a potential tool for activists. However, double standards may not 
be obvious, so there is work to be done to become aware of them, make them 
visible to others and to behave in ways that highlight them. 
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